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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 745

Accident time: 07:40

Accident Date: 11/07/2007

Where it occurred: CBU 203, See map
coordinates

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident

Date of main report: 11/07/2007

ID original source: None

Name of source: UN MACC SL

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M77 submunition

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
soft
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 0

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM: 707270/3679376 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report
A brief QA report of this incident was made available in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file
has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.
This record will be revised if more information becomes available.
The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
LAF SAMPLING TEAM INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR [Demining group] BAC
SUBSURFACE CLEARED SITE AT TASK CBU- 203
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Date: 11.07.2007

1. BACKGROUND OF TASK
Task Start date: 17 October 2006
Task end date: 21 December 2006
Task: CBU- 203,
Task Dossier 7 - 002
UTM of Task: 707270 3679376
Organisation Involved: [Demining group]
Reported by: [Name removed] &LAF Sampling Team
Reported to: Mr. [Name removed] (Operations Officer MACC SL), Mr. [Name removed] (Chief
of QA MACC SL), Ltn. [Name removed], Mr. [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM
ERW Type found: US M-77 Submunition

2. DETAILS OF ITEMS FOUND on SubSurface [Demining group] BAC Task
Evidence
Sampling Team located submunition M77 on CBU 203 in cleared and completed area by
[Demining group].
Item found in depth 5cm.

Interview with [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM
[Name removed] [Demining group] TFM arrived on site after the item reported to be found in
[Demining group] previously cleared task, on his arrival myself as Supervisor ([Name
removed]), LAF Sampling Team, TL, LAF Planning Officer, MACC SL Operations Officer and
MACC SL Chief of QA section went on location of item M 77 found and [Name removed]
[Demining group] TFM agreed that item found was inside the cleared task by [Demining
group] subsurface
Photos of Item M77 located in CBU 203

[M77 as found]
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[Other photographs showed significant other amounts of metal found during the check. The
demining group was clearing with metal-detectors so should have left cleared ground metalfree.]

Reported by: [Name removed] QA Officer, LAF Sampling Team Site Supervisor.
[No record of the corrective action required of the demining group was made available.]

Analysis
The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as Field control inadequacy
because the demining group was clearing using Minelab metal detectors and apparently left
significant metal behind, including at least one M77 submunition. The only explanation for so
much metal being left is that the search was not conducted appropriately and parts of the
Task area were not searched. This is the “Inadequate training” referenced under Notes.
Given the time lapse between the end of the clearance and the QA check (seven months), it
is possible that some of the metal was placed after the event. It is also possible that some
came from the destruction of devices at the end of the Task (although this should have been
collected to prevent its causing trouble during the QA check).
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full report with
some explanation of how the device was missed and what was done to correct the situation.
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